STEPHEN V. WILSON, District Judge.
On October 29, 2010, Ricky Monteilh ("Plaintiff") filed this suit against the County of Los Angeles, Evelyn Gonzalez, Edyth Redmond, Maricruz Trevino, the City of West Covina, and Does (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff's claims arise from the Defendants' alleged removal of his child, J.M., from Plaintiff's home. On April 6, 2011, the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") was filed, substituting Officers Michelle Figueroa and Jeff Mosley as Defendants for unnamed Does. The FAC alleges a deprivation of the rights of familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as warrantless entry into Plaintiff's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The facts are undisputed except where noted. Plaintiff is the legal father, but not the biological father, of minor J.M., a male
On June 21, 2009, Plaintiff was driving a vehicle with J.M. sitting in the back seat behind the passenger seat. (PSGD ¶ 11). J.M. began kicking the back of the driver's seat while the vehicle was in motion. (PSGD ¶ 12). Plaintiff requested J.M. to stop kicking the seat, but J.M. did not. (PSGD ¶ 13). In an effort to stop J.M., Plaintiff attempted to grab J.M.'s pant leg, but instead Plaintiff unintentionally grabbed J.M.'s bare leg. (PSGD ¶ 14). As a result, J.M.'s leg was bruised.
J.M. showed his bruise to his grandfather and the school principal. (PSGD ¶ 16). On June 24, 2009, the principal reported the bruise. (PSGD ¶ 17). On June 25, 2009, two City police officers went to Plaintiff's house and interviewed Plaintiff and J.M. (PSGD ¶ 18). The officers determined that no crime had occurred. (PSGD ¶ 18).
On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff, on his own accord, decided to meet with a County social worker, Keefer. Keefer told Plaintiff to schedule a doctor's appointment for J.M. so his bruise could be examined. (PSGD ¶ 20). On July 9, 2009, Plaintiff took J.M. to a doctor. The doctor was informed of the bruise and that J.M. had been experiencing nosebleeds.
Sometime in July 2009, J.M.'s case was assigned to a different County social worker, Defendant Gonzalez. (PSGD ¶ 22). On July 29, 2009, Defendant Gonzalez consulted with a County supervisor, Defendant Redmond, and decided to remove J.M. from Plaintiff's home. (PSGD ¶ 23). Defendant Gonzalez was given authority to detain J.M. by Defendant Redmond and another supervisor, Defendant Trevino. (PSGD ¶ 24). Defendant Gonzalez contacted the West Covina Police Department to seek assistance in removing J.M. (PSGD ¶ 25).
On July 29, 2009, Defendant Officers Figueroa and Mosley received a radio dispatch call for "keeping the peace" at Plaintiff's residence. Defendants Figueroa and Mosley arrived at Plaintiff's residence and met with Defendant Gonzalez and another social worker, Norma Barron. (PSGD ¶ 28). At this point, a conversation about the removal of J.M. took place between Gonzalez, Barron, Mosley, and Figueroa. (Mosley Depo. 46:1-7; 68:3-10; Figueroa Depo. 52:10-15). Thereafter, Plaintiff was contacted and came to the front door of his residence. (PSGD ¶ 28). Defendant Gonzalez informed Plaintiff that she was from County Child Services and was there to detain J.M. (PSGD ¶ 29). Neither Figueroa nor Mosley spoke to Plaintiff regarding the reason for the detention. (PSGD ¶ 30). Defendant Gonzalez asked Plaintiff to bring J.M. out of the residence and Plaintiff complied. (PSGD ¶ 35).
Defendant Gonzalez also instructed Plaintiff to re-enter his house to gather clothing for J.M. (Decl. of Monteilh ¶ 11; Decl. of Figueroa ¶ 10; Decl. of Mosley ¶ 10). At this point, Defendants Figueroa and Mosley entered Plaintiff's residence without a warrant and followed Plaintiff to the bedroom. (PSGD ¶ 36). Plaintiff contends that he did not consent to any Defendant entering his home, though Officer Mosley testified Plaintiff did consent.
Rule 56(c) requires summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.1997).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may satisfy its Rule 56(c) burden by "`showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2000). Only genuine disputes "where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party" over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Qualified immunity shields public officials sued in their individual capacity for monetary damages, unless their conduct violates "clearly established" law that a reasonable public officer would have known. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Qualified immunity involves a two-part analysis, requiring the court to determine whether, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right," and "whether the right was clearly established." Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. "A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. However, it is within the Court's discretion to decide which of the two prongs should be addressed first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
To be clearly established, the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
There must be "some parallel or comparable fact pattern to alert an officer that a series of actions would violate an existing constitutional right." Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir.2008). To be established clearly, however, there is no need that "the very action in question [have] previously been held unlawful." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). "[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law . . . in novel factual circumstances." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). However, "`if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the] issue, immunity should be recognized.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)).
Plaintiff asserts two constitutional violations against the City Defendants. First, Plaintiff contends that the Officers violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by either being integral participants in J.M.'s removal, or by failing to intercede in the removal. Second, Plaintiff contends that in addition to participating in J.M.'s removal, the Officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his home.
The City Defendants contend that they did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they did not physically remove J.M. from Plaintiff's home, did not make the decision to remove J.M., and were not involved in the process of removing J.M. Further, the City Defendants argue that their duty to intercede does not extend to the County social workers, who are not fellow officers. As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the City Defendants argue that warrantless entry was justified because exigent circumstances existed.
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff's first claim is based in Procedural Due Process, or Substantive Due Process. This debate has little importance at present because the City Defendants' Motion does not assert that J.M.'s removal was constitutional.
"A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978)) (internal quotations omitted). As such, a police officer who is merely a bystander to his colleagues' conduct cannot be found to have caused any injury. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 770 (9th Cir.2009); see also Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting a jury instruction that allowed the jury to "lump all the defendants together, rather than require it to base each individual's liability on his own conduct"). Instead, a plaintiff must "establish the `integral participation' of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation." Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir.2002); see also Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir.2008).
Officers who are "integral participants" in a constitutional violation are potentially liable under § 1983, even if they did not directly engage in the unconstitutional conduct themselves. Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir.2004). Officers are not integral participants simply by the virtue of being present at the scene of an alleged unlawful act. Jones, 297 F.3d at 936. Instead, integral participation requires some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the violation. See id.
Officers are fundamentally involved in the alleged violation when they provide some affirmative physical support at the scene of the alleged violation and when they are aware of the plan to commit the alleged violation or have reason to know of such a plan, but do not object.
Plaintiff relies exclusively on Boyd in arguing that the Officers were integral participants in the alleged constitutional violation, which is the taking of a child without a Court Order or imminent danger to the child. Indeed, as in Boyd, where the officers provided armed back-up for the single officer who deployed the flash-bang, here, the Officers admit that they stood outside Plaintiff's home, behind the social workers, armed, and in full uniform.
Additionally, Plaintiff points to no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Officers should have known of the absence of a Court Order. It is undisputed that the Officers knew that (1) they were called only to maintain the peace; (2) the social workers would remove the child; and (3) the father had been violent in the past. Plaintiff never demanded to see a Court Order, nor did the social workers ever give the Officers a reason to believe that they were acting without a Court Order. Unlike cases where Officers have an independent duty to investigate the veracity of a citizen's complaint, here, the social workers, by virtue of their status as County officials, implicitly indicated they had authority to remove the child by stating they were present to remove the child from a violent father.
To circumvent the fact that the Officers were not reasonably on notice that an unlawful act was occurring, Plaintiff attempts to narrowly define the unlawful act as solely the act of physically removing J.M. Indeed, it is undisputed that the Officers knew that J.M. would be removed. Plaintiff analogizes to Boyd, where the officers were integral participants by virtue of having knowledge of the physical act of using the flash-bang. However, Boyd was an excessive force case—where, by having knowledge of the plan to use the flash-bang, the officers were on notice that a particular level of force would be used. By contrast, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
The Officers had no knowledge of the situation before their arrival at the scene and had been instructed to maintain the peace by their dispatcher. Upon arrival, the Officers were informed by County social workers that a child would be removed and the social workers confirmed they were called to maintain the peace. The Officers did not participate in the decision to remove the child, physically remove the child, or have any conversations with either Plaintiff or the child. Though the Officers' presence at the scene may have provided some comfort to the social workers, without the requisite knowledge or reason to know that an unlawful act is taking place, the Officers' presence cannot transform them from peacekeepers to integral participants in the unlawful conduct. Here, the undisputed evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find that the Officers actually knew, or had a reason to know, that the social workers did not possess a Court Order.
The Officers' Summary Judgment Motion on the basis of integral participation in the Fourteenth Amendment violation is GRANTED.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if the Officers were not integral participants in J.M.'s removal, they had a duty to interfere with Defendant Gonzalez's unconstitutional removal of J.M.
The parties agree that "[p]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen." Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd on other grounds) (internal quotations omitted). "Importantly, however, officers can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they had an opportunity to intercede." Id. An officer's duty to intercede arises only when a fellow officer is acting under the color of state law, but not when the fellow officer is engaged in private violence. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 987, 116 S.Ct. 515, 133 L.Ed.2d 423 (1995). Furthermore, bystander officers only have a duty to stop a violation when they know or have reason to know of the constitutional violation. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1029-30 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that bystander officer could not be liable for failure to intercede in unlawful search by fellow officers because he had no reason to
The City Defendants contend there was no duty to intercede because Cunningham and its progeny involved a police officer's duty to intervene with other police officers, while in this case, Plaintiff contends that police officers had a duty to intervene with a County social worker. Although the Ninth Circuit has not spoken on this issue and the parties have cited no cases, in Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit held that a county police officer may be liable for failing to intervene with a city police officer when the city police officer used excessive force. Id. at 919. However, unlike in Hale, Plaintiff asserts that law enforcement officers had a duty to intervene when non-law enforcement agents (social workers), with specific expertise in regulations involving child abuse, violated Plaintiff's rights. See Gordon, 29 F.3d at 298 ("The Constitution does not require all public employees to intercede, outside their own bureaucratic hierarchies, on behalf of persons whose rights are in jeopardy."); Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir.1994) ("It is widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence.") (emphasis added).
Even assuming that the principle in Hale extends to this case, the vast majority of cases, including Hale, involve an officer's failure to intercede when fellow officers are employing unlawful force.
Finally, whether or not the duty to intercede is even applicable in this case for the reasons discussed above, the Court has already determined that the Officers did not know or have any reason to know that a constitutional violation was occurring in this case. Thus, on this basis alone, the Officers cannot be liable on a duty to intercede theory.
The Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Duty to Intercede issue is GRANTED.
Unreasonable government intrusion into the home is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). "[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371). It is undisputed that the Officers entered Plaintiff's home without a warrant. However, the Officers contend that exigent circumstances existed such that no warrant was required.
"Officers have probable cause for a search when `the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). Probable cause is determined based on "the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time." United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.2002).
"There are exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry by police officers into a home if the officers have a reasonable belief that their entry is necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Huff v. City of Burbank, 632 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2009)) (internal quotations omitted). The government can meet its heavy burden of showing exigent circumstances only by presenting "specific and articulable facts." Id. at 545.
In addition to the exigent circumstances doctrine, which derives from an "investigatory function," the Ninth Circuit recognizes an "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement, which derives from police officers' "community caretaking function." Huff, 632 F.3d at 548-49. Under the emergency doctrine, officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have "an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that an emergency is occurring and immediate action is necessary to protect themselves or others from serious, imminent harm." Id. at 549 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).
Whether reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances existed in a given situation is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138 (citing McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.1984)). "Summary judgment in favor of the defendants is improper unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it is clear that no reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated." Id.
Although the City Defendants argue that the exigent circumstances doctrine is applicable, they make no attempt to show probable cause.
Although Officer Figueroa claims that she was told that Plaintiff had been "violent in the past," she was never told that his violence involved a weapon nor that the violence was directed at anyone else but J.M.
Moreover, the City Defendants do not contend that the law was unclear. It was clearly established that warrantless entry
The City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is DENIED. Further, factual disputes exist as to whether Plaintiff consented to the Officers' entry.
The Officers also assert that no reasonable jury could find their conduct rises to the level of "evil motive or intent" or "reckless or callous indifference" to Plaintiff's rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Although it seems that based on the record developed thus far that there may not be a basis for punitive damages even if a Fourth Amendment violation is later proven, the Court reserves a ruling on the issue until evidence is presented at trial.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment cause of action is GRANTED. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment cause of action is DENIED. The Court reserves judgment on punitive damages until evidence is presented at trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Additionally, the Officers claim their entry was justified to protect themselves, which falls best under the emergency exception— which allows entry when immediate action is necessary to protect oneself or others from serious, imminent harm. However, the City Defendants do not contend that the emergency doctrine is applicable. Even had the City Defendants advanced the emergency doctrine, the Court would reject the argument for the same reasons discussed below—that no objectively reasonable officer would believe that there was imminent danger to justify entry into Plaintiff's home based on the facts viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
